Abstract: This talk will focus on the analysis of attacker-defender interactions on distribution networks (DNs) using game-theoretic tools. Two attack models will be considered: (i) manipulation of distributed generation (DG) nodes in electricity distribution networks to induce sudden supply-demand mismatch; (ii) strategic disruption of network links in urban water networks to increase non-technical losses. In the first model, the defender responds to the adversary’s action by imposing both DG control and partial load control at the uncompromised nodes under nonlinear power flow constraints. In the second model, the defender strategically chooses an optimal network sensing strategy to maximize detection performance under the sensors’ constraints on the range of detection. Full characterization of equilibrium strategies will be presented for each model of attacker-defender interaction. The equilibrium strategies provide practical recommendations for improving the resilience of network monitoring and control tools in the face of strategic attacks. Bio: Saurabh Amin is Robert N. Noyce Career Development Assistant Professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). His research focuses on the design and implementation of high confidence network control algorithms for infrastructure systems. He works on robust diagnostics and control problems that involve using networked systems to facilitate the monitoring and control of large-scale critical infrastructures, including transportation, water, and energy distribution systems. He also studies the effect of security attacks and random faults on the survivability of networked systems, and designs incentive-compatible control mechanisms to reduce network risks. Dr. Amin received his Ph.D. in Systems Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley in 2011. He is a recipient of NSF CAREER award, and Google Faculty Research award.