Srinivas Yerramalli, USC
Wednesday, Jan 18, EEB 248, 2:00pm
Abstract: Cooperation in wireless networks results when nodes exploit the broadcast nature of the wireless medium and use their resources to mutually enhance transmissions. It is assumed in general that all network nodes are willing to cooperate. However, when self interested and rational nodes are allowed to cooperate, it is necessary to examine whether the cooperation of all users can be taken for granted. There are two major disincentives for cooperation in a typical network; cost of cooperating and insufficient gains from cooperation. In this talk, I discuss the problem of transmitter cooperation over a multiple access channel. Using tools from cooperative game theory, I will show whether the grand coalition forms and if so the scenarios in which it is stable and how stability can be enforced. I will then talk about some recent work on its dual problem, receiver cooperation over a broadcast channel, and discuss some of the similarities and differences between the two scenarios.
Bio: Srinivas Yerramalli is a Ph D candidate at USC working with Prof. Urbashi Mitra. Prior to this he obtained his B.Tech degree from the International Institute for Information Technology in Hyderabad, India. His research interests lie in the general areas of wireless communications, signal processing and optimization, and his PhD work has been focused towards high speed underwater acoustic communications.
Host: Alex Dimakis, dimakis [at] usc.edu
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