Dr. G. P. Papavassilopoulos National Technical University of Athens
Thursday, November 17, 2016 2:00 – 3:00PM EEB 248
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to formulate and study a game where there is a player who is involved for a long time interval and several small players who stay in the game for short time intervals. Examples of such games abound in practice. For example a Bank is a long term player who stays in business for a very long time whereas most of its customers are affiliated with the Bank for relatively short time periods. A University and its Students provide another example and it is this model that we use here for motivating and posing the questions. The University is considered to have an infinite time horizon and the Students are considered as players who stay in the game for a fixed period of five years (indicative number). A class of Students who start their studies at a certain year is considered as one player /Student who is involved for five years. This player overlaps in action with the other students who entered at different years and with the University. We study this game in a Linear Quadratic, Deterministic, Discrete and Continuous Time setups, where the players use Linear Feedback Strategies and are in Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium, and where the Students have the same cost structure independently of the year they started their studies. An important feature of the solutions derived is that they lead to Riccati type equations for calculating the gains, which are interlaced in time i.e. their evolution depends on present and past values of the gains. In the continuous time setup this corresponds to integrodifferential equations.
Bio: G. P. Papavassilopoulos received the Diploma in Mechanical and Electrical Engineering from the National Technical University of Athens in 1975 and the MSc and PhD degrees in Electrical Engineering from the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign in 1977 and 1979 respectively. In 1979 he joined the Dept. of Electrical Engineering-Systems of the University of Southern California as an Assistant Professor and was later promoted to Associate and Full Professor with tenure. In 2000 he joined the Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering of the National Technical University of Athens as Full Professor where he is also the director of the Control and Decision Laboratory. His basic areas of interest are Controls, Optimization, and Dynamic Games. A considerable part of his research is in the area of Dynamic Stochastic Games. He has also conducted research in Decentralized Adaptive Control, Robotics, Optimization Algorithms, Target Interception, Jamming, Stochastic Learning Automata, Linear Complementarity Problems and Bilinear Matrix Inequalities for Robust Control, Computational Complexity, Markovian Learning, Parallel Algorithms for Nonconvex Problems, Genetic Algorithms, and Nonlinear Filtering. He is also interested in applications to Biomedical Engineering, Economics, Organizational Structures, Energy and Telecommunication Policy, and Environmental Problems. (For more information: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.control.ece.ntua.gr_&d=DgIF-g&c=clK7kQUTWtAVEOVIgvi0NU5BOUHhpN0H8p7CSfnc_gI&r=GNHzxv37-BWK_j-46NdwJiEATas1A1fmJZHQYKB5dXQ&m=cPLSL1v0_uk-_l1mrsi0g_7J_o4UWyjqjNJ2UcmLhUY&s=NMfUZ3yT2pLZWy_g0gSHWII3Rz1hlw6RSQCAEV-yPzg&e= )