

# CS356 Unit 7

## Data Layout & Intermediate Stack Frames

# Structs


CS:APP 3.9.1

- Structs (classes) are just collections of \_\_\_\_\_ data
- Each member is usually laid out in \_\_\_\_\_ memory locations (with some \_\_\_\_\_ inserted to ensure alignment)
  - Padding is necessary if there are alignment requirements for certain data types
  - Intel machines don't require alignment but perform better when it is used

```
struct Data1 {
    int x;
    char y;
};

struct Data2 {
    short w;
    char* p;
};

struct Data3 {
    struct Data1 f;
    int g;
};
```



# Class Example (1)

- Classes are just structs and lay out their data the same way
- Member function calls are converted to \_\_\_\_\_ function calls with the \_\_\_\_\_ pointer passed as the first argument

```
class ObjA {
public:
    char c; int x;
    void update(int z);
};

void ObjA::update(int z)
{ c = 'a'; x = z; }

int main()
{
    ObjA item;
    item.update(7);
    cout << item.c << item.x << endl;
    return 0;
}
```

What you write...

```
class ObjA {
public:
    char c; int x;
    void update(int z);
};


void ObjA::update(_____, int z)
{ _____ = 'a'; _____ = z; }

int main()
{
    ObjA item;
    update(_____);
    cout << item.c << item.x << endl;
    return 0;
}
```

...what the compiler sees

# Classes Example (2)

- Structs (classes) are just collections of heterogeneous data



```
class ObjA {
public:
    char c; int x;
    void update(int z);
};

void ObjA::update(ObjA* this, int z)
{ this->c = 'a'; this->x = z; }

int main()
{
    ObjA item;
    update(&item, 7);
    cout << item.c << item.x << endl;
    return 0;
}
```

```
_ZN4ObjA6updateEi:
    movb $97, (%rdi)
    movl %esi, 4(%rdi)
    ret

main:
    pushq %rbx
    subq $32, %rsp
    movq %fs:40, %rax
    movq %rax, 24(%rsp)
    xorl %eax, %eax
    movl $7, %esi
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rdi
    call _ZN4ObjA6updateEi
    ...
```

# Unions


CS:APP 3.9.2

- Unions allow multiple variable types to \_\_\_\_\_ the \_\_\_\_\_ memory with the understanding only \_\_\_\_\_ type will be in use at any time for a given object
  - All elements start at offset \_\_\_\_\_
  - The size of the union is simply the size of the \_\_\_\_\_ member
  - Elements must be POD (plain old data) or at least default-constructible

```
union Data1 {
    int x;
    char y;
};

union Data2 {
    short w;
    char* p;
};

int main()
{
    union Data1 item;
    item.x = 0x356; item.y = 'a';
}
```



Buffer "overrun"/"overflow" attacks

# EXPLOITS VIA THE STACK AND THEIR PREVENTION



# Arrays and Bounds Check

CS:APP 3.10.3

- Many functions, especially those related to strings, may not check the \_\_\_\_\_ of an array
- User or other input may \_\_\_\_\_ a fixed size array
  - Suppose the user types or passes "Tommy" to greet() or func1()
  - Note: gets() receives input from 'stdin' until the user hits 'Enter' and places the string in the given array

```
void greet()
{
    char name[10];
    gets(name); // cin >> name;
    ...
}
```

```
void func1(char* str)
{
    char copy[10];
    strcpy(copy, str);
    ...
}
```





# Arrays and Bounds Check

- Many functions, especially those related to strings, may not check the bounds of an array
- User or other input may overflow a fixed size array
  - Suppose the user types or passes "Tommy" to greet() or func1()
  - Now suppose the user types or passes "Bartholomew"


```
void greet()
{
    char name[10];
    gets(name); // cin >> name;
    ...
}
```

```
void func1(char* str)
{
    char copy[10];
    strcpy(copy, str);
    ...
}
```




# Buffer Overflow

- Now recall these local arrays are stored on the stack where other \_\_\_\_\_ and the \_\_\_\_\_ are stored
- In this example, gets() will copy as much as the user types (until they enter the '\n' = 0x0a), overwriting anything on the stack



# Overwriting the Return Address


- An intelligent user could carefully craft a "long" input array and overwrite the return address with a desired value
- How could this be exploited?



# Executing Code

- We could determine the desired \_\_\_\_\_ for some sequence we want to execute on the machine and enter that as our string
- We can then craft a \_\_\_\_\_ to go to the starting location of our code

CS:APP 3.10.4



# Exploits

- Common code that we try to inject on the stack would start a \_\_\_\_\_ so that we can now type any other commands
- We can enter specific binary codes when a program prompts for a string by entering it in hex using the \x prefix




Typing: "\x54\x6f\x5d..." allows you enter the hex representation as a string

# Methods of Prevention

- Various methods have been devised to prevent or make it harder to exploit this code
  - Better \_\_\_\_\_ that do not allow an overrun
    - strcpy(char\* dest, char\* src) => strncpy(char\* dest, char\* src, size\_t len)
  - Add a stack protector (a.k.a. \_\_\_\_\_)
  - Address space layout \_\_\_\_\_ (ASLR) techniques
  - \_\_\_\_\_ control bits


# Canary Values

- Compiler will insert code to generate and store a \_\_\_\_\_ value between the return address and the \_\_\_\_\_
- Before returning it will \_\_\_\_\_ whether this value has been \_\_\_\_\_ (by a buffer overflow) and raise an error if it has




# Motivation for Randomization

- Notice that to call our exploit code we have to know the \_\_\_\_\_ address on the stack where our exploit code starts (e.g. 0x7ffff0e8) and make that our RA
- The stack usually starts at the \_\_\_\_\_ address when each program runs so it might be fairly easy to predict
  - Run the program on our own server to learn its behavior, then run on a server we want to exploit
- Idea: Randomize where the stack will \_\_\_\_\_




# Motivation for Randomization

- The OS can allocate a random amount of space on the stack each time a program is executed to make it harder for an attacker to succeed in an exploit
  - This is referred to as **ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization)**
- Note: Our previous exploit string would now have a return address that does not lead to our exploit code and likely result in a \_\_\_\_\_ rather than execution of the exploit code




## nop Sleds

- Fact: Most instruction sets have a \_\_\_\_\_ instruction that is an instruction that does nothing
  - Can also just use an instruction that does very little (e.g. movq \_\_\_\_\_)
- Idea: \_\_\_\_\_ as many 'nop' instructions as possible in the buffer before the exploit code
- Effect: Now our guess for the RA does not need to be \_\_\_\_\_ but anywhere in the \_\_\_\_\_ of nops
  - This yields a higher chance of actually landing in a location that will eventually cause the exploit to be executed



## Memory Protection & Permissions

- Processor have hardware to help track areas of memory \_\_\_\_\_ by a program (aka MMU = Memory Management Unit) & verify appropriate address usage
- When performing a memory access the processor will indicate the desired operation:
  - \_\_\_\_\_
- This will be compared to the access permissions stored in the MMU and catch any violation
  - The stack area can be set for No-eXecute (NX or X=0)
  - If the processor sees an attempt to execute code from the stack it will halt the program



## Code Injection Attacks

- These buffer overflow exploits have all tried to copy code into some area of memory and then have it be executed
- We refer to this approach as **code-injection** attacks
- Use of ASLR and No-eXecute controls can greatly reduce the risk of exploiting buffer overflow vulnerabilities
- Beyond code-injection techniques, alternative exploits such as **return-oriented programming** are explored in our projects

Purpose of %rbp as "Base" or "Frame" Pointer

## STACK FRAMES

# Stack Frame Motivation 1


CS:APP 3.10.5

- Under certain circumstances the compiler cannot easily generate code using the stack pointer (%rsp) alone
  - The most common of these cases is when the needed allocation size is variable

```
int varArray(int n)
{
    int temp1=7, data[n], temp2=1;
    ...
}
```

*Compiler doesn't know n when it generates the code*

```
movl (%rsp), %eax # access temp1
movl 4(%rsp), %ecx # access data[0]
movl ??(%rsp), %edx # access temp2?
```




# Stack Frame Motivation 2

- We access local variables using a constant displacement from the %rsp (i.e. 8(%rsp))
- But if we have to move the stack pointer up a *variable* amount (only known at runtime) there is **no constant displacement** the compiler can use to access some local variables (e.g. temp2)
  - Would need to compute the offset based on the variable size and use (reg1,reg2,s) style address mode which would be slower

```
int varArray(int n)
{
    int temp1=7, data[n], temp2=1;
    ...
}
```

```
movl (%rsp), %eax # access temp1
movl 4(%rsp), %ecx # access data[0]
movl ??(%rsp), %edx # access temp2?
```




# Base/Frame Pointer

- Since we may not know the offsets of variables relative to the stack pointer, a common solution is to use a second register call the **base or frame pointer**
  - x86 uses %rbp for this purpose
- It points at the base (bottom) of the frame and remains stable/constant for the duration of the procedure
- Now constant displacements relative to %rbp can be used by the compiler

Main point: The base/frame pointer will always point to a **known, stable location** and other variables will be at constant offsets from that location

```
int varArray(int n)
{
    int temp1=7, data[n], temp2=1;
    ...
}
```

```
movl (%rsp), %eax # access temp1
movl 4(%rsp), %ecx # access data[0]
movl -4(%rbp), %edx # access temp2
```




# Saving the Old Base Pointer

- Since each function call needs its own value for %rbp we must save/restore it each time we call a new function
- Generally we setup the base pointer as the first task when starting a new function

```
int main()
{
    int num;
    ...
    varArray(num)
}
```

```
int varArray(int n)
{
    int temp1=7, data[n], temp2=1;
    ...
}
```



# Setting up the Base Pointer

- Below is the common **preamble** for a function as it saves the old base pointer and sets up its own
- The **base pointer can be used during execution**
- The last 3 instructions are the **postamble** to restore the old base pointer and then exit

```

1 varArray:
  pushq %rbp      # Save main's %rbp
  movq  %rsp, %rbp # Set up new %rbp
  subq  $16, %rsp  # Allocate some space
  ...
2  movl  -8(%rbp), %edx # access temp2
  ...
  movq  %rbp, %rsp # Deallocate stack space
  popq  %rbp      # Restore main's %rbp
  ret
  
```

